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384 
No More Tiers? 
Proportionality as an Alternative to Multiple 
Levels of Scrutiny in Individual Rights Cases 
 




The Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution contains 
no express provision calling for courts to balance the right of an 
individual against the social cost of enforcing that right.  This 
stands in contrast to general twentieth-century constitutional 
documents adopted by western democracies.  The Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 for example, provides that the 
rights provided are “subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.”2  Rights may be strong, but they are clearly 
not absolute.  The document itself calls for some sort of 
balancing. 
Does the absence of such an express constitutional provision 
in the United States Constitution mean that rights are to be 
protected as absolutes, or at the very least, that they may be 
limited only to the extent necessary to protect other individual 
rights rather than general social welfare concerns?3  A century 
of Supreme Court opinions rejects this conclusion.  Instead, the 
Court has struggled to frame the appropriate balancing test 
when confronted with a rights claim.  Should there be a single 
master balancing test, appropriate for all rights claims, or a 
range of tests depending on the right claimed? 
If some form of balancing is inevitable, what sort of 
balancing test or tests is called for?  Since the earliest days of 
 
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School 
1.  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
2.  Id. § 1. 
3.  The position that rights always outweigh general social interests, and 
may be limited only to further other rights, is most closely identified with 
Ronald Dworkin.  See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-94 
(1978). 
1
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individual rights litigation in the United States, the Supreme 
Court has opted to apply different tests, different “tiers” of 
analysis, depending on the classification of the right or interest 
involved.  The courts of most other western democracies have 
opted instead for a single analytical framework, generally 
labeled “proportionality” analysis.4  The American multi-tiered 
approach might be expected to lead to more predictable 
outcomes, yet, in recent decades, the application of these tests 
has become progressively less determinative of outcomes.  Strict 
scrutiny seems not quite so strict; low level rational basis 
analysis is not quite so deferential to government and the 
creation of a new intermediate scrutiny, not to mention a range 
of tests for specific First Amendment categories, has only added 
to the confusion. 
This article will explore how the explicit adoption of 
proportionality analysis as a single analytical tool might lead, 
not only to a more coherent approach to individual rights cases, 
but will also bring together aspects of the current multiple 
analytical tiers in a way that allows full consideration of both 
the individual rights and the social values present in these 
cases. 
Part I of this article will give a brief overview of the history 
of the creation and application of the various tiers of analysis 
used by the United States Supreme Court and explore how the 
once-sharp difference in those applications have blurred in 
recent years.  Part II will describe the proportionality analysis 
used by other nations’ courts in a wide range of individual rights 
cases.  Part III will focus on how an explicit adoption of 
proportionality might lead to significant improvement in the 
analysis of cases presenting issues under the free exercise 
clause, currently a particularly confusing and contentious source 
of debate. 
4. See generally AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (2012). 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/5
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I. The Three Tiers of Analysis: A Short History 
 
Some form of balancing in the resolution of individual rights 
claims under the United States Constitution is inevitable.  
Occasionally, this will be due to the language of the relevant 
constitutional provision itself, such as the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition of “unreasonable” searches and seizures.5  But more 
often, it will be due to the severe problems associated with any 
attempt to declare that a right is absolute.  Of course, one might 
say that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments provide an 
“absolute” right to “due process” of law,6 and the Eighth 
Amendment “absolutely” bans “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”7  But in cases such as these, the balancing will 
occur in the process of defining, rather than applying, the 
provision. 
There have been occasional defenders of the concept of 
absolute constitutional rights, at least in specific contexts.  
Justice Hugo Black famously advocated “absolute” protection of 
speech under the First Amendment.8  But he was able to do so 
only by excluding from his definition of the speech protected 
absolutely a great deal of communicative behavior that his 
colleagues brought within the protection of the Amendment.9  In 
other words, he was employing his own version of balancing in 
order to protect his commitment to absolutism.  Ronald Dworkin 
maintained that rights were “trumps” that always outweighed 
mere societal interests.10  But that did not eliminate the need to 
 
5.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
6.  U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV. 
7.  U.S. CONST. amend VIII. 
8.  See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J., 
Black, J., dissenting) (insisting that material considered obscene was still 
entitled to First Amendment protection); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 
494, 580-81 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (rejecting any reasonableness test in 
cases involving advocacy of subversive activity).  
9.  Justice Black would not have given First Amendment protection to 
public school students protesting American involvement in the Vietnam War 
by wearing black armbands.  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).  Nor would he give First 
Amendment protection to a protester wearing a jacket with an offensive word 
on it in public.  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., joined 
by Burger, C.J., and Black, J., dissenting). 
10.  See generally DWORKIN, supra note 3. 
3
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engage in a form of balancing in defining the scope of the right.  
And, of course, when rights conflict with other rights, a different 
type of balancing is required. 
Balancing, thus, is inevitable in some form.  Of course, it 
still has its critics.  Balancing two things of the same kind may 
yield predictable results, but how does one confidently balance 
things that are unlike each other?11  Does that uncertainty give 
the balancer too much leeway to simply impose his or her own 
preferences?  Does the indeterminacy of balancing delegitimize 
the entire project?  In theory, perhaps, and yet experience shows 
that some form of balancing in constitutional rights cases is 
inevitable. 
But conceding the inevitability of balancing is just the first 
step.  What kind of balancing to employ?  Those suspicious of the 
indeterminacy of balancing would be expected to try to make it 
more determinate.  And one way to try to minimize 
indeterminacy is to do your balancing at the wholesale, rather 
than the retail, level.  In other words, declare that categories of 
individual activity (or government action), after weighing their 
significance against the competing interest, cut so sharply in 
favor or against permitting the right to prevail, that a decision 
in any individual case falling within this category becomes 
nearly automatic.  Against this background, the evolution of 
“tier” related constitutional analysis can be understood. 
The 1905 Supreme Court case of Lochner v. New York12 can 
be viewed as the starting point for development of what would 
become at least two of the tiers of modern constitutional rights 
analysis.  The 5-4 decision invalidating New York’s statutory 
limits on the hours worked by those employed as bakers 
produced three opinions, one for the Court majority, and two in 
dissent.  Justice Peckham, writing for the majority, found that 
the right to freely contract with regard to labor conditions was 
well-recognized and subsumed in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.13  This would require New York to satisfy a 
 
11.  See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (commenting that attempting to balance 
incommensurate interests is “like judging whether a particular line is longer 
than a particular rock is heavy”). 
12.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
13.  Id. at 52-53. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/5
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stringent test to justify the regulation.  To be valid, it would need 
to be shown necessary to promote the important state interest 
in health and safety.14  Applying what would evolve into the 
modern strict scrutiny test, Justice Peckham invalidated the 
statute.15 
Sharply dissenting, Justice Holmes advocated a highly 
deferential approach to a legislative choice to regulate when the 
regulation was challenged under the Due Process Clause.16  
Justice Holmes would invalidate the statute only when it was 
clear that no rational legislator could have believed the 
legislation was a reasonable step toward achieving a legitimate 
goal.17  The Holmes approach would grow into what would later 
be designated the low-level rational basis or minimal scrutiny 
test.  For decades, the approaches of Justices Peckham and 
Holmes would contend for recognition in a variety of 
constitutional contexts. 
As those following Justice Peckham and those following 
Justice Holmes would contend over the years, the third opinion 
in Lochner seemed to fade into the background, if not disappear 
entirely from the conversation.  Justice Harlan, writing in 
dissent for himself and two colleagues, rejected Justice 
Peckham’s approach, but would not go quite so far in deference 
to the legislature as Justice Holmes.18  Harlan would defer to the 
state when the state could produce a reasonable amount of 
evidence in support of the health and safety purpose and effect 
of the statute, with no further need to weigh that evidence 
against evidence to the contrary, or to insist on the absolute 
necessity of the state’s act.19  This middle-ground alternative to 




14.  Id. at 58. 
15.  Id. at 64-65. 
16.  Id. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
17.  Id. at 76. 
18.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65-72 (1905) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
19.  Id. at 69 (“[T]he court may inquire whether the means devised by the 
State are germane to an end which may be lawfully accomplished and have a 
real or substantial relation to the protection of health”).  The court should not 
interfere merely because the means are “not the wisest or best.”  Id. at 68. 
5
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If the virtue of what would become known as strict scrutiny 
was, at least in part, its predictability, the three decades of the 
Lochner era are somewhat puzzling.  Instead of consistently 
rejecting state law regulating working conditions, the Supreme 
Court decisions turned on the Court’s view of just what types of 
workers and industries truly required regulation.20  And so, 
while bakers working hours could not be regulated, those of 
miners could;21 women could receive protection that men could 
not;22 and despite the obvious practical connection between 
workers’ wages and hours, states could not regulate wages, even 
where hours were subject to limitation.23  Did the Peckham 
approach clarify the law, or merely install the Supreme Court as 
a supreme legislature? 
Lochner, of course, did not survive.  In a series of cases in 
the 1930s and 1940s, the Court made it clear that state 
regulation of economic matters would be subject only to the low-
level rational basis scrutiny advocated by Justice Holmes in his 
Lochner dissent.24  But a significant question remained: Was 
Lochner wrong because its early version of strict scrutiny was 
always inappropriate, or only because that test was applied in 
the wrong category of cases?  The Court began to address this 
question in the late 1930s. 
In United States v. Carolene Products Co.,25 Justice Stone, 
writing for the Court, included what is usually regarded as the 
most famous footnote in Supreme Court history.  His “footnote 
4” suggested that a heightened level of scrutiny would be 
appropriate where the Court was faced with one of three types 
 
20.  Id. at 54-59 (recognizing that “the kind of employment” and “the 
character of the employe[e]s” might make it reasonable and proper for the 
State to interfere to prevent the employees from being constrained by the rules 
laid down by the proprietors in regard to labor). 
21.  Id. at 75 (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (upholding 
maximum hour legislation applying to underground miners)). 
22.  Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding maximum hour 
legislation for women workers). 
23.  Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating 
legislation creating a minimum wage for women workers). 
24.  See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling 
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 525, and upholding the minimum wage statute); Nebbia v. 
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding a price regulation of milk aimed at 
stabilizing output during Great Depression). 
25.  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/5
BESCHLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/18  10:27 PM 
390 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 38:2 
of legislation.26  The first was a statute in conflict with a 
specifically enumerated constitutional right.  The second 
included statutes that interfered with the proper functioning of 
the democratic process. And finally, heightened scrutiny would 
be called for when a statute disadvantaged a “discrete and 
insular” minority group.27 
The 1944 case of Korematsu v. United States28 presented the 
Court with a clear example of a statute disadvantage, a “discrete 
and insular” racial minority.  The case challenged the World War 
II practice of removing Japanese-Americans from the West 
Coast to internment camps for the duration of the war.29  In 
language that can be seen as the birth of the modern, post-
Lochner era, strict scrutiny test, the Court declared that only 
“[p]ressing public necessity” could justify the practice.30  But, 
ironically, the case that revived strict scrutiny also stands as the 
only Supreme Court decision in modern times that held that a 
facially racial classification was justified by such necessity.31  
History has largely repudiated the holding of Korematsu (and 
vindicated the dissenting opinions of Justices Jackson, Murphy, 
and Roberts),32 but the principle of subjecting racial 
classification to a test of “pressing public necessity” survives, 
and demonstrated its power in Brown v. Board of Education33 
and subsequent cases invalidating government sponsored racial 
discrimination. 
By the early 1960s the test that could trace its history back 
to Lochner had gained a new name: “strict scrutiny.”  The 
“pressing public necessity” standard of Korematsu had been 
unpacked in a two-step requirement.  Government, in order to 
satisfy strict scrutiny, must demonstrate that the statute had a 
compelling purpose, and was necessary to achieve the purpose 
 
26.  Id. at 152 n.4. 
27.  Id. 
28.  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
29.  Id. at 216-17. 
30.  Id. at 216. 
31.  Id. at 223-24. 
32.  In 1988, Congress enacted legislation acknowledging the 
“fundamental injustice” of the relocation program and providing restitution to 
Japanese-Americans forced to leave their homes.  Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-338, 102 Stat. 903 (1988). 
33.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
7
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(often referred to as the absence of any less restrictive 
alternative).34  Early application of strict scrutiny went beyond 
the context of equal protection cases involving race, to include 
First Amendment claims, both involving free speech35 and free 
exercise,36 and cases involving voting rights.37 
Each of these applications fell within the boundaries of 
Justice Stone’s “footnote 4” suggestion of the proper scope of 
heightened scrutiny.38  More controversial, however, was the 
Court’s revival of substantive due process in Griswold v. 
Connecticut.39  Connecticut’s longstanding, but rarely, if ever, 
enforced, prohibition on the use of contraceptives that extended 
even to married couples did not implicate an enumerated 
constitutional right, despite Justice Douglas’s contention that 
the privacy right involved was part of the “penumbra” of Bill of 
Rights provisions,40 and Justice Goldberg’s reference to the open 
ended language of the Ninth Amendment.41  While Griswold’s 
narrow holding with respect to the privacy rights of married 
couples with respect to contraceptive decisions would not by 
itself change much state or federal law, the recognition of 
privacy, without a clear definition of the concept’s scope, as a 
fundamental right that triggered strict scrutiny analysis of any 
government limitation would lead to intense controversy in 
subsequent years. 
By the 1960s, the crucial nature of the Supreme Court’s 
initial decision on rights was evident.  Professor Gerald 
Gunther, perhaps the era’s most respected constitutional 
scholar, famously stated that strict scrutiny was a test “strict in 
theory, fatal in fact”,42 in other words, essentially calling for per 
 
34.  See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986). 
35.  See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1994) 
(holding content-sensitive restrictions subject to strict scrutiny). 
36.  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (holding the denial of 
religiously based exemption from statutory duty to accept Saturday work as a 
condition of receiving state unemployment benefits is subject to strict 
scrutiny). 
37.  See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 676 (1966) 
(invalidating poll tax). 
38.  See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
39.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
40.  Id. at 483. 
41.  Id. at 486-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
42.  See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/5
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se invalidation of the state action.  On the other hand, low-level 
rational basis scrutiny, following the lead of Holmes in his 
Lochner dissent, essentially led to a finding of per se validity. 
But as the 1960s gave way to the 1970s, the supposed clarity 
of the two-tier analysis that led to automatic outcomes began to 
show cracks.  Perhaps most obviously, this took place in the 
Supreme Court’s gender discrimination cases.  Prior to 1971, the 
Court had never suggested that a distinction made by the 
government on the basis of sex was in any way suspect.  To the 
contrary, the Court upheld such distinctions with little 
analysis.43  In the 1971 case of Reed v. Reed,44 however, the Court 
struck down a gender-based classification for the first time.  
Idaho provided that in appointing an administrator for the 
estate of a decedent who died without a will the probate court 
should, when male and female relatives of the decedent were of 
the same relation to him or her, choose the male relative.45  The 
Court struck down the statutory provision, but claimed to be 
doing so after applying only minimal rational basis scrutiny.46  
The State had defended the statute as in pursuance of efficiency 
by eliminating the need for a hearing on the qualifications of the 
male and female relatives, and the presumption that the male 
would likely have more experience with financial matters.47  
While the stereotyping is obvious today in the latter conclusion, 
could it be said in 1971 that such a presumption was entirely 
irrational under the highly deferential sense that Holmes had 
advocated?  Was Reed actually a strict scrutiny case that could 
not bring itself to declare its actual analytical basis? 
 
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 794 
(2006) (referring to an analysis of the extent to which Gunther’s quip is still 
accurate). 
43.  See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding jury selection 
system that excluded women except those who affirmatively indicated desire 
to serve); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding Michigan statute 
prohibiting women who were not wives or daughters of tavern owners from 
working there as a bartender); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) 
(upholding Illinois restriction of bar membership for law practice to men). 
44.  See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971). 
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. at 76 (holding that a classification must be reasonable, not 
arbitrary). 
47.  Id. at 74. 
9
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Two years later, the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson48 
seemed to shift to a strict scrutiny analysis for gender 
discrimination cases.  The Court invalidated the federal statute 
that created a presumption that the civilian wife of a male 
member of the military was financially dependent on him, 
entitling the couple to spousal benefits, while requiring a civilian 
husband to establish actual dependency on his military wife’s 
income.49  Justice Brennan, writing for a four-justice plurality, 
found that this gender-based distinction should be subjected to 
heightened scrutiny.50  He was joined by four concurring justices 
who did not specify the level of scrutiny they thought 
appropriate.51  Nevertheless, many thought that Frontiero had 
made strict scrutiny the appropriate test for gender 
discrimination claims in the future. 
But a series of cases over the next few years made that 
assumption highly questionable. Using language that sounded 
more like rational basis than strict scrutiny analysis, the Court 
struck down two statutory distinctions between males and 
females and upheld two others.52  Finally, in 1976 the Court 
resolved the question of the appropriate level of scrutiny in 
gender discrimination cases.  In Craig v. Boren,53 the Court 
invalidated Oklahoma’s different male and female ages for 
alcohol consumption.54  In doing so, it turned neither to minimal 
 
48.  See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
49.  Id. at 679-80. 
50.  Id. at 688. 
51.  Id. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring) (“It is unnecessary for the Court 
in this case to characterize sex as a suspect classification”) Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Blackmun joined Justice Powell’s concurrence. Justice 
Stevens wrote a one-sentence concurrence, and Justice Rehnquist dissented.  
Id. 
52.  See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637-38 (1975) 
(invalidating a Social Security Act provision enabling widowed mothers, but 
not widowed fathers, to benefit based on earnings of deceased spouse); 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (invalidating a 
regulation requiring school teachers to take maternity leave long before their 
due date).  But see Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (upholding 
federal statute allowing women in the Navy a longer period of time in which to 
earn promotion than men before being discharged); Kahn v. Shevin 416 U.S. 
351, 360 (1974) (upholding property tax exemption for widows but not 
widowers). 
53.  See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
54.  Id. at 210. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/5
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or strict scrutiny, but settled on a new third tier, less rigorous 
than strict scrutiny, but more so than low-level rational basis 
analysis.  Logically enough, this test would become known as 
intermediate scrutiny.55  To defend a sex-based classification, 
government would now need to demonstrate an important 
(rather than either a compelling or merely legitimate) state 
interest and demonstrate a substantial (rather than either a 
necessary or minimally rational) reason for recognizing gender 
differences in addressing the state interest.56  Unsurprisingly, 
this new level of scrutiny would lead to less certain outcomes.57 
As a new tier of analysis was born, developments in cases 
involving both low-level scrutiny and strict scrutiny were 
making those tests somewhat less determinative.  A series of 
Supreme Court decisions applying the minimal rational basis 
test nevertheless invalidated the challenged government action 
by finding that the asserted government intent was illegitimate.  
In United States v. Moreno,58 the Court invalidated an 
amendment to the Food Stamp Act that had the effect of 
disqualifying low-income unrelated adults who were living 
together from the program.59  The Court found that the 
amendment was motivated by simple hostility to “hippie” 
lifestyle choices, and not to any legitimate purpose of the Act.60  
In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,61 the Court declined to 
apply heightened scrutiny to a local zoning decision refusing a 
special use permit for the operation of a group home for mentally 
disabled residents.  Nevertheless, the Court invalidated the 
decision under rational basis analysis, finding that the decision 
was a product of “irrational prejudice” against the mentally 
 
55.  Id. at 197. 
56.  Id. 
57.  See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding selective 
service registration requirement imposed only on males); Michael M. v. 
Superior Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding statutory rape 
statue punishing teenage male but not teenage female rapists).  But see United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (invalidating state military academy 
restriction to male cadets); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding 
preemptory challenges to jurors based on sex unconstitutional).  
58.  See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
59.  Id. at 529-30. 
60.  Id. at 534-35. 
61.  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
11
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disabled.62 
Two decades later, the Court would invalidate an 
amendment to the Colorado State Constitution that would 
prohibit the state or any subdivision from enacting legislation 
that protected gays and lesbians from discrimination.63  Noting 
that a wide range of other groups, not protected as suspect 
classes under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution, could freely seek legislative protection from 
discrimination by their states, the Colorado amendment’s 
closing off any such legislative protection for only a single class 
of citizens could be seen as resting on nothing more than mere 
hostility toward that group.64  Under cases such as Moreno, such 
hostility could not serve as a legitimate purpose.65 
Romer v. Evans,66 the Colorado amendment case, would 
foreshadow subsequent decisions on homosexual rights.  
Lawrence v. Texas67 struck down the Texas statute that 
criminalized homosexual activity.  In doing so, the Court neither 
held that sexual orientation was a suspect classification for 
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, nor that consensual 
sexual activity by adults was a fundamental right for purposes 
of Due Process analysis, but rather applied the rational basis 
test.68  Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, found that the 
fact that the statute might accurately reflect the moral 
sentiments of most Texans was inadequate to provide a 
legitimate state interest for the statute.69  Unsurprisingly, 
dissenting justices noted that legislative enforcement of 
majoritarian views of immorality was hardly uncommon,70 and 
had been widely assumed to be valid.  The Supreme Court’s 
 
62.  Id. at 450. 
63.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
64.  Id. at 634-35. 
65.  See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 528 (1973). 
66.  Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35. 
67.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
68.  Id. at 578 (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest”). 
69.  Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)) (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a state has 
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason 
for upholding a law prohibiting the practice”). 
70.  Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196) 
(“The law . . . is constantly based on notions of morality”). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/5
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Obergefell71 decision, striking down state restrictions on same-
sex marriage, while often seen as the third case in the Court’s 
gay rights trilogy, could expressly employ strict scrutiny based 
upon the earlier recognition of marriage as a fundamental 
right.72  Lawrence, however, claims to be a minimal scrutiny 
case, expanding the earlier holding that mere hostility to a group 
cannot serve as a legitimate state interest73 to include the 
principle that majority views of immorality, standing alone, are 
also insufficient to justify a restriction on personal liberty. 
Just as minimal rational basis scrutiny can no longer be 
seen as leading to automatic affirmance of the challenged 
statute, strict scrutiny can no longer be seen as, in Gunther’s 
formulation, “strict in theory, fatal in fact.”74  This is most 
evident in the Supreme Court’s treatment of race-based 
affirmative action programs in higher education.  In the Court’s 
1977 Bakke75 decision rejecting the suggestion of dissenting 
justices that a program using race to compensate racial 
minorities for their earlier victimization should be subjected to 
only intermediate scrutiny when challenged under the Equal 
Protection Clause,76 the Court held that strict scrutiny would be 
applied to racial classification regardless of which racial group 
was disadvantaged.77  While the affirmative action program was 
invalidated, dicta in Justice Powell’s opinion suggested that 
some such programs could survive.78  After decades of debate 
over the significance of Powell’s dicta, more recent cases have 
shown that selective institutions of higher learning may, in fact, 
use race as a factor in admissions decisions when it is done in a 
 
71.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
72.  See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (using strict scrutiny to 
strike down state refusal to grant marriage license to man in arrears on child 
support payment); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating 
prohibition on interracial marriage). 
73.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 
(1973). 
74.  See Winkler, supra note 42. 
75.  See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
76.  Id. at 356-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
77.  Id. at 305. 
78.  Id. at 316-17 (discussing with approval the Harvard College 
undergraduate admissions program). 
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narrowly tailored way, despite the rigor of strict scrutiny.79 
In 1963, the Supreme Court held that strict scrutiny was 
the appropriate test to use in assessing a state’s refusal to grant 
an exemption to a generally applicate statute where the 
exemption was sought on the grounds of the free exercise clause 
of the First Amendment.80  As will be discussed in more detail 
below, after a few subsequent cases applying strict scrutiny to 
insist that the state grant the exemption,81 the Court began a 
string of free exercise cases that upheld the government’s 
decision, either by carving out an exception to strict scrutiny or 
by declaring that the government had satisfied the test.82  By 
1990, free exercise analysis had become so muddled that Justice 
Scalia, writing for a five justice majority could claim that strict 
scrutiny never actually was the Court’s standard.83  The Court’s 
Smith decision held that strict scrutiny would apply in free 
exercise claims only where the statute or practice of government 
was not one generally applicable, but rather singled out religious 
believers for disadvantage out of hostility toward religion.84  In 
other cases, minimal scrutiny would suffice. 
The struggle to settle on an appropriate tier of analysis has 
been obvious in the debate over abortion rights.  In 1973, Roe v. 
Wade85 held that strict scrutiny would be applied to any 
 
79.  See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (upholding 
affirmative action plan at the University of Texas); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding affirmative action plan at University of Michigan 
Law School). 
80.  See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
81.  See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 
(1981) (unemployment benefits cannot be denied to pacifist who quit rather 
than work on building military equipment); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972) (Old Order Amish granted exemption from statute requiring that 
children remain in formal schooling until age 16). 
82.  See, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (upholding 
prison regulation prohibiting Islamic inmates from holding Friday religious 
service using reasonableness standard); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 
(1986) (Orthodox Jewish military officer not entitled to exemption from 
military uniform regulations).  
83.  Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Resc. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-
79 (1990). 
84.  See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520 (1993) (ordinance applying only to religious ritualistic animal sacrifice 
invalidated under strict scrutiny). 
85.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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government attempt to limit first and second-trimester 
abortions.  In Roe’s wake, strict scrutiny in its traditional 
rigorous form led to a fairly consistent series of decisions striking 
down regulations short of criminalization.86  But as political 
opposition to abortion rights grew in the 1980s, significant 
judicial opposition followed.  With changes in the composition of 
the Supreme Court by the end of the decade, many foresaw the 
Court reversing Roe and returning abortion restrictions to 
analysis under minimal scrutiny. 
In 1992, Planned Parenthood v. Casey87 presented the Court 
with an opportunity to reaffirm Roe-like scrutiny or to return 
abortion restitutions to pre-Roe minimal scrutiny.  Neither 
posits could command the votes of a majority.  Four justices did 
call for abandoning Roe’s strict scrutiny and returning to the 
rational basis test.88  Two justices, in contrast, strongly defended 
strict scrutiny.89  Justices O’Connor, Souter and Kennedy joined 
neither approach, and in a joint opinion, put forward a middle 
ground.90 
Rather than simply invoking intermediate scrutiny, the 
joint opinion added an analytical step that divided abortion 
restrictions into two categories.  If a restriction posed an “undue 
burden” that would stand as a significant obstacle to a woman’s 
pre-viability abortion, strict scrutiny would be applied.91  If the 
regulation did not present such a burden, rational basis analysis 
would be sufficient.92  The undue burden test clearly makes 
outcomes less determinate.  In Casey itself, it led to the 
invalidation of only one of three challenged Pennsylvania’s 
statutory provisions.93  And in the two significant Supreme 
 
86.  See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 
416 (1983) (invalidating requirement that all abortions after the first trimester 
be performed in hospitals); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 
(1976) (invalidating requirement that a married woman gain consent of her 
husband for an abortion).  
87.  See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
88.  Id. at 944-78 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); id. at 979-1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
89.  Id. at 912-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting part); id. 
at 922-943 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
90.  Id. at 843-911. 
91.  Id. at 874-77. 
92.  Id.  
93.  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 987-88 (1992) (striking 
15
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Court decisions involving abortion restrictions since Casey, the 
Court has decided one in favor of the state, and one against.  In 
Gonzalez v. Carhart,94 the Court upheld a federal statute 
prohibiting a particular method of late-term abortion.95  Justice 
Kennedy cast the deciding vote and wrote the Court’s opinion, 
while his co-author of Casey’s joint opinion, Justice Souter, 
dissented.96  More recently, however, Justice Kennedy joined the 
majority opinion of Justice Breyer in Whole Women’s Health 
Center v. Hellerstedt,97 which struck down a number of Texas 
statutory regulations on abortion providers. 
First Amendment free speech cases have developed their 
own context-specific tests.  While there are a few general 
principles, for example, that content-sensitive regulation will 
receive greater scrutiny than content-neutral provisions, it can 
be stated that a wide range of tests have emerged depending on 
the category of speech regulated and the nature of the 
regulation.  Some of these resemble strict scrutiny,98 others 
suggest a more rational basis analysis.99  Still, others seem to 
suggest an intermediate scrutiny, either in their stated 
standards or their application.100 Government acts or statutes 
imposing subsequent punishment on speech,101 those that 
impose prior restraints by administrative or judicial action,102 
and those that merely regulate time, place, and manner,103 are 
 
down spousal notification requirement). 
94.  See Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
95.  Id. at 134-136. 
96.  Id. at 169-191 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
97.  See Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
98.  See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (strong protection for 
symbolic political speech). 
99.  See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1980) 
(zoning ordinance limiting “adult motion picture theatres” upheld). 
100.  See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 
U.S. 557 (1980) (intermediate test applied to regulation of commercial speech). 
101.  See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (hate speech must 
present “true threat” in order to warrant punishment); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (speech must satisfy an incitement standard to validate 
punishing speech).  
102.  See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 
(1992) (denial of parade permit may not be based on content of the speech); 
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (injunctions against speech held to 
extremely high standard). 
103.  See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
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subjected to different levels of scrutiny, even where the category 
of speech involved is fully within First Amendment protection. 
First Amendment claims seeking access to public property 
for speech activity are subject to different analysis depending on 
the classification of the property involved as a public forum or 
not.104  And a range of speech categories once thought to be 
beyond the scope of the First Amendment, such as defamation,105 
commercial speech,106 obscenity,107 and others, have been given 
at least limited protection under their own category-specific 
tests.  And as new media emerges, courts must determine 
whether to create new tests or to fit them into existing 
categories.  While the elements of this myriad of tests overlap to 
some extent, it is still necessary to recognize their separate 
identity and their separate aspects.  Just recalling the names of 
the tests, usually derived from the Supreme Court case first or 
most clearly enunciating them, can be a challenge. 
More than a century after Lochner had laid down the 
building blocks of strict scrutiny and minimal rationality as 
alternative approaches in constitutional rights cases, we have 
seen the heirs of Justice Peckham and Justice Holmes contend 
for preeminence, but recent decades have seen, across a number 
of constitutional contexts, unease with either of those sharply 
opposed positions.  This has led to a number of approaches 
pushing the strict scrutiny and rational basis tests away from 
leading to near per se validity or invalidity of statutes, and the 
creation to new analytical tools standing between the two classic 
opposites.  A new generation of jurists seem to be rediscovering 
the wisdom of the often forgotten Lochner dissent of Justice 
Harlan, seeking some middle ground,108 one more deferential 
than strict scrutiny, but requiring more analysis than Holmes 
would require. 
 
(regulations aimed at excessive noise upheld). 
104.  See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 
(1992) (airport concourses). 
105.  See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (standards 
applied in cases of “public figures” and others); New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964) (alleged defamation of public official). 
106.  See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
107.  See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
108.  See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
17
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The virtue of the strict scrutiny—minimal scrutiny dyad 
would seem to lie in its greater degree of predictability.  The 
alternatives are more indeterminate, in the interest of taking 
account of the context of specific decisions.  Each of the tests asks 
important questions, but is there a way to preserve the value of 
these questions yet end the judicial quibbling over which the 
appropriate labelled test is being applied as it should be, or is 
merely another test in disguise? 
 
II. Proportionality: An Alternative to Current Approaches 
 
Proportionality is hardly a new concept.  As a principle that 
demands that a balance be struck, it can appear in private 
decision-making, under the guise of cost-benefit analysis.  
Whether under the label of cost-benefit analysis or otherwise, 
decisions by legislators and government regulators constantly 
employ proportionality analysis.109  While the outcomes of such 
analysis may be controversial, the use of proportionality 
balancing is hardly controversial.  Indeed, it is inevitable.  
Whether legislation sets the extent of punishment for particular 
crimes,110 the amount of tolerable pollution discharged from 
factories,111 the relative rights of landlords and tenants,112 or 
innumerable other things, balances must be struck. 
When we take proportionality out of the legislative or 
administrative realm and look at it when used by courts to 
review the balances struck by the political branches, its 
legitimacy may be seen as less obvious.  Legislators must, after 
all, balance; they have no choice.  Judges, on the other hand, can 
 
109.  See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY 
PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW 13-26 (2009) (tracing the concept back to early 
“just war” principles). 
110.  See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995) (discussing the provision of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1986 and its provisions treating possession and sale of crack cocaine for more 
seriously than the possession and sale of powder cocaine).  
111.  See Citizens Against Refinery’s Effects, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 643 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981) (discussing Clean Air Act of 1967). 
112.  See generally Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic 
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms 
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always simply defer rather than do their own balancing.113  
Judicial invocation of proportionality balancing is least 
controversial, of course, when judges are framing common law 
doctrine.  Here, they are acting as a sort of quasi-legislator, but 
in a well-accepted context. 
And so, the common law principle that contract damages are 
limited to compensating foreseeable losses, as well as the 
principle that contract damages must be compensatory rather 
than punitive, were framed by judges using common law 
reasoning.114  In tort law, Judge Learned Hand famously framed 
a balancing test to apply to the thorny problem of proximate 
cause.115  When judges engage in proportionality analysis to 
review the decisions of other decision makers, however, the 
results can be more controversial. 
In criminal law contexts, whether under the label of 
“reasonableness,” proportionality, or elsewhere, the concept is 
well represented.  Drawing its authority from the constitutional 
prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment and excessive 
fines,116 as well as the general guarantee of due process,117 the 
Supreme Court has placed at least some limits on the severity of 
criminal punishment, sometimes making explicit reference to 
the concept of proportionality.118  While continuing to reject the 
contention that the death penalty is always a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment, the Court has set forth limitations on its 
use based in proportionality review.  In Coker v. Georgia,119 the 
Court held that the death penalty for rape was grossly 
disproportionate.  The Court laid down the following test: 
 
 
113.  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONAE 10-15 (2015) 
(discussing different roles assumed by judges, specifically the “soldier” role, 
where judges believe in simply “following orders” in deferring to other branches 
of government).  
114.  See SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note 109, at 37-49. 
115.  United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 
1947). 
116.  U.S. CONST. amend VIII. 
117.  U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV. 
118.  See SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note 109, at 91-168, for an overview of 
the use of proportionality in U.S. Supreme Court cases involving criminal 
justice issues. 
119.  See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
19
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[A] punishment is “excessive” and 
unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable 
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment 
and hence is nothing more than the purposeless 
and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or 
(2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of 
the crime.120 
 
A punishment is disproportionate when it no longer bears a 
sufficient relationship to the goals of punishment recognized as 
legitimate–primarily deterrence and retribution.121  The “cruel 
and unusual” language of the Eighth Amendment, then, 
implicitly includes a prohibition on excessive punishment.  And 
because even the most draconian punishment might achieve 
some degree of deterrent or retributive effect, the implication is 
clear that the punishment must be somewhat more effective in 
securing these ends than an easily identifiable and available 
lesser punishment.  In Coker, that was life imprisonment.122 
The Court has been much more reluctant to recognize a 
proportionality requirement in reviewing the length of prison 
terms.  In Solem v. Helm,123 the only case in which the Court has 
found a prison sentence to be unconstitutionally lengthy, Justice 
Powell’s opinion for the Court stated that while legislative 
judgments on prison terms were entitled to great deference and 
a reversal of such legislative decisions should be “exceedingly 
rare,” courts were empowered to weigh proportionality in such 
cases by examining, (1) “the gravity of the offense and the 
harshness of the penalty,”124 (2) “the sentences imposed on other 
criminals in the same jurisdiction,”125 and (3) “compar[ison of] 
the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other 
jurisdictions.”126  A few years later, the Court rejected a claim 
that a mandatory life sentence for a first offense of possession of 
 
120.  Id. at 592 (citation omitted). 
121.  Id. 
122.  Id. at 594 (the Court noted the strong trend in state legislatures 
against capital punishment for rape). 
123.  See generally Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
124.  Id. at 291. 
125.  Id. 
126.  Id. at 291-92. 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/5
BESCHLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/18  10:27 PM 
404 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 38:2 
a significant amount of cocaine was unconstitutional.127  Justice 
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, disputed the 
contention that the length of a prison term could ever violate the 
Eighth Amendment.128 
Three concurring justices recognized the possibility that a 
prison sentence could be unconstitutionally disproportionate, 
but found that the “narrow” proportionality principle of Solem 
should be invoked to overturn legislative judgments in such 
cases where “extreme sentences . . . [were] ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ to the crime.”129 
The Supreme Court has yet to find that a fine violated the 
Excessive Fines Clause due to its disproportion to the offense, 
but the Court has invoked the Clause to invalidate a civil or 
criminal forfeiture.130  To the extent that the forfeiture is 
designed to punish rather than simply act in a remedial way, the 
forfeiture could not be “grossly disproportionate” to the gravity 
and harm caused by the offense.131 
Shifting attention from the Eighth Amendment to the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, the Court’s engagement 
in some degree of social cost-benefit analysis is obvious, and, to 
some extent, inevitable.  The Fourth Amendment bar on 
“unreasonable” searches requires balancing of some sort.  The 
Court’s frequent return to the scope of the Miranda132 doctrine 
seems to be a textbook example of cost-benefit analysis, as does 
the Court’s determination of the Sixth Amendment insofar as it 
requires the state to provide counsel for indigent defendants.133 
Apart from criminal law issues, the Supreme Court has 
employed proportionality review in a few contexts not falling 
into the category of rights cases that traditionally call for the use 
 
127.  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
128.  Id. at 994-95. 
129.  Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (citation omitted). 
130.  See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334-40 (1998). 
131.  Id.  See also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993). 
132.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that criminal 
defendants are entitled to information on their rights to silence). 
133.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that indigent 
defendants are entitled to appointed counsel); SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note 
109, at 95-114 (discussing the explicit and implicit use of proportionality 
principles in the Supreme Court’s definition of the rights of criminal 
defendants).  
21
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of one of the three recognized tiers of review.  The first context 
involves the imposition of punitive damages in civil cases.  In 
1989, the Court rejected the contention that the Eight 
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause was relevant in cases not 
involving government-imposed punitive measures.134  
Subsequent cases, however, found that the Due Process Clause 
could serve as a basis for limiting punitive damages, as such 
damages were entitled to a presumption of validity, and rejected 
the use of the traditional heightened scrutiny tiers of review to 
such awards.135 
Finally, in BMW v. Gore136 and State Farm v. Campbell,137 
the Court invalidated punitive damage awards as excessive, and 
established a framework for assessing such awards under the 
Due Process Clause.  First, the trial court should assess the 
blameworthiness of the defendant’s conduct and the actual and 
potential harm caused by the defendant’s wrongful acts.138  
Second, the size of the punitive damage award should be 
proportionate to the actual harm.139  Unless the defendant’s acts 
were particularly egregious, the Court suggested that a ratio of 
more than a single-digit to one of the punitive to compensatory 
damages would be suspect.140  Finally, a trial court should 
consider whether a punitive damage award was necessary to 
deter future misconduct.141 
In considering when the imposition of conditions on 
landowners seeking development permits might violate the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the 
Supreme Court held that a valid condition must be “roughly 
proportional” in its goals of alleviating the public burdens 
created by the proposed development.142  As in the case of 
punitive damages, the test is relatively easy to state, however it 
 
134.  See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 
U.S. 257 (1989). 
135.  See TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pac. 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
136.  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
137.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
138.  Gore, 517 U.S. at 575-80. 
139.  Id. at 580-82. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. at 583-85. 
142.  See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
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may be difficult to calculate in an individual case.  Does the 
condition go beyond simply alleviating the threatened public 
harm caused by the development?143 
These discrete references to proportionality in cases calling 
for a form of cost-benefit analysis show that the Supreme Court 
has recognized the usefulness of the concept.  But how, if at all, 
can that be applied in cases involving equal protection, 
substantive due process, or First Amendment issues?  Would 
proportionality threaten the insights developed in the 
application of the three tiers of analysis currently in use? 
Western democracies have developed proportionality tests 
for the application of rights provisions that, while perhaps 
differing in detail, employ similar analytical steps.144  An 
examination of these steps will reveal their similarity to the 
analytical steps required in the application of the tier-based 
analysis used in the United States.  The first step is to determine 
whether the specific claim falls within the scope of the 
constitutional right.145  While many cases will fall easily either 
within or without the scope of the rights, some will not be that 
clear.146  And if the determination of the initial question is 
resolved within a system limiting the treatment of claims to two 
options, one leading to essentially guaranteeing that the claim 
will prevail (strict scrutiny) and the other promising almost 
inevitable rejection of the claim (minimal scrutiny), the 
resolution of this threshold question is critical. 
A clear example in First Amendment speech clause 
jurisprudence involves the activity usually designated as 
“symbolic speech,” that is, activity not involving the use of words 
 
143.  Id. at 391. 
144.  See generally BARAK, supra note 4 (probably the most comprehensive 
single volume overview of the use of proportionality in individual rights cases 
decided by courts in western democracies). 
145.  Id. at 45-83.  Barak maintains that a constitutional rights provision 
should be interpreted “generously.”  Id. at 69 (citing, among other cases, the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s statement in R v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 
S.C.R. 295 (Can.) (interpreting freedom of conscience provision of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms)). 
146.  The United States Supreme Court has had to wrestle, for example, 
with the issue of what belief systems qualify as “religions” since the 1960s. See 
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 
163 (1965). 
23
BESCHLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/18  10:27 PM 
2018 NO MORE TIERS? 407 
but conveying a message.147  Over the years, the Supreme Court 
has developed a relatively generous test to resolve the question 
of when wordless activity can qualify for the First Amendment 
protection.148  But at the same time, the Court was developing 
analytical tests that rejected absolute protection in favor of some 
type of balancing.  Justice Black, famous for his advocacy of 
absolute First Amendment protections, objected to the Court’s 
extension of the protection to forms of wordless activity.149  Both 
Black and his judicial adversaries seem to have clearly 
understood that no legal system can provide absolute 
constitutional protections without limiting the scope of the right 
entitled to such protection.150 
Similarly, the development of the Due Process privacy right 
established in Griswold have largely turned on the disposition 
of this initial analytical question.  If the consequences of placing 
something within the scope of the Griswold privacy right leads 
to near absolute protection, we can anticipate a reluctance by 
the Court to take that step.  On the other hand, a narrow scope 
of the privacy right, to the extent that it deprives the claimant 
of any chance of success, will be unacceptable to a more rights-
sensitive decision-maker.  While proportionately requires the 
same initial step as the current tier-sensitive approach, the 
stakes of this step are less dramatic.  If including a particular 
claim within the scope of a right does not guarantee that the 
claimant will prevail, but only opens the door to further analysis, 
we might expect that the courts will be more open to a broad 
scope of such rights as privacy or free speech. 
At this point, it would also be helpful to assess the weight of 
the alleged right.151  Whether framed in terms of a dichotomy 
 
147.  See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
148.  “In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient 
communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have 
asked whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, 
and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood 
by those who viewed it.’”  Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)). 
149.  See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.  
150.  See generally Donald L. Beschle, Does a Broad Free Exercise Right 
Require a Narrow Definition of “Religion”?, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 357 
(2012). 
151.  The weight of the right will come into play in the final, “balancing” 
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between rights that are “fundamental” and those less weighty, 
or on a scale recognizing different levels of significance, the 
weight of the right will come into play later in the analysis of the 
state’s action for its proportionality.152  But it is important to 
note that the absence of a right traditionally labelled 
“fundamental” does not end the analysis.  Only a determination 
that the claim is outside the scope of the right entirely will do 
that. 
The next step of a proportionality analysis, unsurprisingly, 
is the identification of the state’s interest, or as some courts put 
it, the “public purpose” of the limitation of the right.153  American 
courts do this routinely in an effort to label the state’s interest 
as “compelling,” “important,” or merely “legitimate.”  The failure 
to satisfy the court that the state’s interest is “compelling” (or at 
least important) will essentially invalidate the state action if it 
conflicts with a right deemed “fundamental.”154  But if the scope 
of rights that are fundamental is unclear, the lines between 
compelling, important, and merely legitimate state interests are 
perhaps even more so.  Rather than allowing the categorization 
of government interests to essentially cut the analysis short, 
typical proportionality review will ask only whether the interest 
is proper.155  The strength of the interest will come into play at 
a later stage.  Only the failure to identify a “proper” interest will 
end the analysis.  This is not significantly different from the 
outcome of American cases where the state has fallen short of 
even establishing a legitimate interest. 
The third step in the proportionality analysis will be to 
determine whether there is a rational relationship between the 
state’s proper interest and the steps taken that allegedly violate 
the asserted right.156  Of course, such a step could be taken with 
varying degrees of rigor.  As was the case with the two prior 
tests, it would seem that a more generous view would be 
appropriate.  In short, this step incorporates something very 
 
step of the proportionality test.  See BARAK, supra note 4, at 359-67. 
152.  Id. 
153.  BARAK, supra note 4, at 245-98. 
154.  See supra notes 12-53 and accompanying text, for the discussion of 
the traditional tiers of review.  
155.  The proper purpose test is a “threshold” test that entails no need to 
balance.  BARAK, supra note 4, at 246-47. 
156.  Id. at 303-16. 
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similar to the minimum scrutiny applied in American cases 
lacking a claim of a fundamental right.  Only a disconnect so 
striking as to suggest that the stated purpose of the state action 
is actually a pretense will fail to satisfy this step.157 
The fourth step of the proportionality analysis is often 
framed as an inquiry into whether the state’s action is 
“necessary” to satisfy the state’s purpose.158  To American 
lawyers, the term will evoke strict scrutiny, and serve as an 
almost insurmountable obstacle to successfully defining the 
state action.  But typically, judicial systems invoking the 
proportionality analysis do not apply this test in its rigid form 
that makes it nearly a per se rule of invalidity.159  Rather than 
insist on absolute necessity, or the absence of any conceivable 
less restrictive alternative, however burdensome that 
alternative might be, proportionality at this stage asks whether 
there is a reasonably clear and practical alternative that would 
satisfy the proper government interest to substantially the same 
extent that this challenged practice does.160  Note the difference 
here between this “necessity” test and the usual application of 
the test in the American strict scrutiny analysis.  Under strict 
scrutiny, the existence of a less restrictive alternative that would 
allow the government to pursue the proper purpose, but to a 
lesser extent, should lead to invalidation of the current 
restriction.  But in the proportionality test, only the presence of 
an alternative that does not impose costs to government in its 
pursuit of proper goals stops the analysis at this point and 
decides in favor of the right claim.161  But if no such alternative 
exists, analysis proceeds to the final step, the balancing test that 
is of the essence of proportionality. 
Prior to this point, the analysis of each step skews against 
an early resolution of the case by requiring less of both the rights 
 
157.  The rational basis component “is not a balancing test,” ruling out 
only government acts that entirely fail to advance the proper purpose.  Id. at 
315. 
158.  Id. at 317-39. 
159.  A law fails the necessity test only where an available alternative 
“can fulfill the law’s purpose at the same level of intensity and efficiency as the 
means determined by the limiting law.”  Id. at 323. 
160.  Id. 
161.  The necessity test, like the rational basis test, is a “threshold” test, 
not an ultimate balancing test.  BARAK, supra note 4, at 338-39. 
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of the claimant and the government than would be the case in a 
regime of heightened scrutiny.  But here, the relative weight of 
the impairment of the right and the strength of the government 
interest must be placed in balance and the case decided.162  This, 
of course, is where the critics of proportionality or any balancing 
test will object most vigorously.  When competing interests are 
of the same nature, where, for example, each party’s loss can be 
measured in dollars, balancing may be appropriate.  But where 
the competing interests to be balanced are of different kinds, is 
the process hopelessly indeterminate?163  But as we have seen, 
discomfort with the supposedly more determinative strict 
scrutiny and minimal scrutiny tests has made them significantly 
indeterminate already, a trend showing little sign of coming to a 
halt.164 
Aharon Barak responds to the criticism of proportionality 
as, at best, no improvement on a simple test asking to balance 
the importance of the individual right against the importance of 
the social value sought by government, by explaining that the 
test of proportionality at this stage is much more limited.  “[T]he 
issue is not the comparison of the general social importance of 
the purpose (security, public safety, etc.) on the one hand and 
the general social importance of preventing harm to the 
constitutional right (equality, freedom of expression, etc.) on the 
other.”165  Such balancing is clearly subject to criticism that it 
improperly ignores the relevant facts of each case.166 
Barak points out that proportionality as employed by 
European, Canadian, and other courts calls for a test focusing 
on the “marginal benefit” to social welfare and the “marginal 
harm” to the right.  Barak explains: 
 
[Proportionality balancing] refers to the 
comparison between the state of the purpose prior 
to the law’s enactment, compared with that state 
 
162.  Id. at 340-70. 
163.  Barak recognizes the practical and theoretical problems with 
balancing two things at disparate as social purpose and individual rights.  Id. 
at 350. 
164.  See supra notes 44-107 and accompanying text.  
165.  BARAK, supra note 4, at 351. 
166.  BARAK, supra note 4, at 351-52. 
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afterwards, and the state of the constitutional 
right prior to the law’s enactment compared with 
its state after enactment. Accordingly, we are 
comparing the marginal social importance of the 
benefit gained by the limiting law and the 
marginal social importance of preventing the 
harm to the constitutional right caused by the 
limiting law. The question is whether the weight 
of the marginal social importance of the benefits 
is heavier than the weight of the marginal social 
importance of preventing the harm.167 
 
This test does call for a consideration of the general overall 
importance of both the right and the social interest involved.  In 
terms familiar to American lawyers, it will be important to 
determine which rights are fundamental, which social interests 
are compelling, and so on.  A small marginal harm to a 
fundamental right might outweigh a significant marginal harm 
to a relatively unimportant social interest, or vice versa.  But the 
analysis is more precise than simply weighing the right in its 
general nature against the general importance of the social 
value sought by government.168 
As a further clarification of the final balancing test of 
proportionality, Barak calls for consideration of whether there 
are alternative approaches that the government might take that 
would be proportional under the marginal harms/benefits test 
and would strike a better balance.169  At an earlier stage of the 
proportionality analysis, we asked whether the government 
action was necessary to achieve the social interest.  At that 
stage, the government action would fail only if there was an 
easily identifiable alternative that would satisfy the social 
interest to the full extent that the current practice does.170  At 
this balancing stage, however, a more detailed analysis is called 
for.  Perhaps an alternative, although reasonably available, will 
have some negative impact on the state’s ability to achieve its 
social goals.  At this stage of analysis, the degree to which that 
 
167.  Id. 
168.  Id. at 351-52. 
169.  Id. at 352-57. 
170.  Id. at 321. 
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is true is considered as part of the balancing of marginal benefits 
and harms.171  The existence of a less restrictive alternative is 
by no means unusual in American constitutional analysis.172  
But here, it is not a question of the existence or non-existence of 
such an alternative, but rather a more sophisticated inquiry into 
how the alternative would shift the balance of the rights and 
interests that is required. 
The similarities and differences between the proportionality 
analysis and the American approach of categorizing rights and 
giving them, as a category, either exceptionally strong protection 
or little at all, can be seen in a number of free speech cases 
decided by the Supreme Court of Canada.  In 1982, the Charter 
of Rights and Freedom was added to the Canadian 
Constitution.173  For the first time, the Charter entrenched a list 
of rights limiting parliamentary supremacy, a doctrine inherited 
from the United Kingdom.  Unlike the language of the Bill of 
Rights of the United States Constitution, however, the Charter 
itself eschews any notion that the rights contained are absolute.  
Section One of the Charter provides that the rights are “subject 
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”174  
Some degree of balancing, then, is clearly provided for. 
In 1986, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the 
framework for analysis under Section One in R. v. Oakes.175  
After determining that a Charter right had been limited and 
that the government had responded by pointing to an interest 
“of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a 
constitutionally protected right,”176 an interest “pressing and 
 
171.  “The issue, therefore, focuses on the constitutionality of the weight 
of the marginal social importance of the benefit and harm” of the individual 
right and the government interest in the individual case.  Id. at 352. 
172.  The existence of a less restrictive alternative was found to be present 
and significant in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), 
for example. 
173.  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, §§ 1-33 (U.K.).  See 
generally DAVID MILNE, THE NEW CANADIAN CONSTITUTION (1982). 
174.  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, § 1 (U.K.).  
175.  R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.). 
176.  Id. at 138 (quoting R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 352 
(Can.)). 
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substantial in a free and democratic society,”177 the Court would 
apply the following test: 
 
First, the measures adopted must be carefully 
designed to achieve the objective in question. They 
must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on 
irrational considerations.  In short, they must be 
rationally connected to the objective. Second, the 
means, even if rationally connected to the 
objective in this first sense, should impair “as 
little as possible” the right or freedom in question. 
Third, there must be a proportionality between 
the effects of the measures which are responsible 
for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the 
objective which has been identified as of 
“sufficient importance.”178 
 
Some, focusing on the statement that the government must 
impair the right “as little as possible,”179 saw the Oakes test as 
something very close to the American strict scrutiny test.  
However, subsequent cases made it clear that the reference to 
proportionality calls for something more flexible and less 
rigorous.180 
American First Amendment law has largely consisted of 
recognizing distinct categories of speech, with some entitled to 
less, or even no constitutional protections.181  Over the years, 
these categories have shifted, generally in the direction of 
greater protection, but the instinct to create and maintain 
categorical approaches remains.  In contrast, Canadian courts 
will apply the single proportionality test of Oakes to any instance 
of communicative activity. 
 
177.  Id. at 138-39 (citation omitted). 
178.  Id. at 139. 
179.  Id. 
180.  Justice Bertha Wilson advocated an approach to the Oakes test that 
was similar to strict scrutiny in American law but concluded that “although 
the Court continues to pay lip service to the strict Oakes test, in many of the 
judgments it has in fact applied it in a less rigorous fashion.” Bertha Wilson, 
Constitutional Advocacy, 24 OTTAWA L. REV. 265, 267-69 (1992). 
181.  See generally Alexander Tsesis, The Categorical Free Speech 
Doctrine and Contextualization, 65 EMORY L.J. 495 (2015). 
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The United States Supreme Court, using a categorical 
approach to free speech cases, has wrestled with the question of 
just what qualifies as speech as opposed to action.  In the 1940’s, 
the Court implicitly found that commercial advertising was 
simply commercial activity rather than protected speech.182  
Decades later, the Court abandoned that position, and has come 
close to providing full First Amendment protection for 
advertising, provided that it is not false or misleading.183 
Canadian proportionality analysis approaches the question 
differently.  Initially, little or no time need be spent determining 
whether advertising raises a free speech issue under the 
Charter.  Any activity that “conveys or attempts to convey a 
meaning, it has expressive content and prima facie falls within 
the scope of the guarantee.”184  But that determination merely 
begins the analysis.  In assessing the provision of the Quebec 
Consumer Protection Act prohibiting most commercial 
advertising directed at children under the age of thirteen, the 
Court went on to weigh the interests involved. 
The Court found “[t]he protection of a group which is 
particularly vulnerable to the techniques of seduction and 
manipulation abundant in advertising” was a “pressing and 
substantial” objective.185  While the evidence that children at or 
close to age thirteen are particularly vulnerable was weaker 
than that involving children younger than seven, the Court held 
that the legislature must have some leeway in setting the precise 
line at which children will be protected.186 
The Court had no trouble finding “that a ban on advertising 
directed to children is rationally connected to the objective of 
protecting children from advertising.”187  On the less obvious 
question of whether the means chosen impaired the right of 
expression “as little as possible,” the Court chose something less 
rigorous than an insistence on the least restrictive option. 
 
 
182.  See Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 53 (1942). 
183.  See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  
184.  Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 969 (Can.). 
185.  Id. at 987. 
186.  Id. at 990. 
187.  Id. at 991. 
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While evidence exists that other less intrusive 
options reflecting more modest objectives were 
available to the government, there is evidence 
establishing the necessity of a ban to meet the 
objectives the government had reasonably set. 
This Court will not, in the name of minimal 
impairment . . . require legislatures to choose the 
least ambitious means to protect vulnerable 
groups.188 
 
Taking account of both the expressive elements of the 
advertising and its ultimate purpose to maximize commercial 
profit, the Court struck the balance in favor of the regulation, 
without minimizing either interest present in the case. 
The proportionality test need not result in outcomes less 
protective of commercial speech than American cases.  In Rocket 
v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons,189 the Court considered 
serious restrictions placed on advertising by dentists pursuant 
to authority granted to the Royal College by the Health 
Disciplines Act.  The regulation limited advertising to the name, 
address, telephone number, and office hours of a dentist.190  It 
also regulated the “means and manner” of advertising, 
prohibiting any conduct that would be reasonably seen as 
“disgraceful, dishonourable or unprofessional.”191  The Court had 
“no difficulty” in holding that the objectives of maintaining high 
levels of professionalism and protecting the public from 
misleading advertising were sufficiently important to justify 
infringement of the right of free expression.192  However, the 
Court found that the regulation was disproportionate to its 
objectives, particularly in its limitation of the amount of 
accurate information that a dentist could convey.193  Again, the 
Court noted that the motive of the advertising was “primarily 
 
188.  Id. at 999. 
189.  See Rocket v. Royal Coll. of Dental Surgeons, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232 
(Can.). 
190.  Id. at 237. 
191.  Id. at 237. 
192.  Id. at 250. 
193.  Id. at 247. 
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economic.”194  But, at the same time, “expression of this kind 
does serve an important public interest by enhancing the ability 
of patients to make informed choices.”195  Commenting on the 
best way to approach commercial speech cases, Justice 
McLachlin wrote: 
 
These two opposing factors—that the expression 
is designed only to increase profit, and that the 
expression plays an important role in consumer 
choice—will be present in most if not all cases of 
commercial expression. Their precise mix, 
however, will vary greatly, which is why I believe 
it is inadvisable to create a special and 
standardized test for restrictions on commercial 
expression, as has been done in the United 
States.196 
 
The use of a single test for the expression cases allows a full 
examination of the competing interests by eliminating the 
temptation to shut analysis down at an early stage by 
categorization and the application of either too lenient, or too 
strict a level of scrutiny, depending on the category of expression 
at issue. 
An even more striking example of the contrast between the 
categorical approach and its various tests, on the one hand, and 
the proportionality test, on the other, can be found in cases 
involving pornography and obscenity.  In 1957, to little surprise, 
the United States Supreme Court held that obscenity was 
unprotected by the First Amendment.197  The Court explained 
that the reason for this was that obscene material lacked any 
social value.198  While the judicial definition of obscenity changed 
over the years,199 along with public tolerance of pornographic 
 
194.  Id. at 250-51. 
195.  Rocket v. Royal Coll. of Dental Surgeons, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232, 247 
(Can.). 
196.  Id. 
197.  See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514-15 (1957). 
198.  Id. at 484-85. 
199.  See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966); Roth, 354 
U.S. at 484 (holding that in order to prosecute material as obscene, the state 
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material, the basic premise remains.  Obscenity, largely defined 
by the absence of any significant social value, as well as its level 
of conflict with community standards,200 is an unprotected 
category.  While the definitional inquiry into the presence or 
absence of social value in the work can be seen as presenting a 
form of balancing, the focus on a definition to determine whether 
the work fits a category limits a full consideration of the state 
and individual interests involved. 
In its 1992 decision, Butler v. The Queen,201 the Supreme 
Court of Canada considered a challenge to the provision of the 
Criminal Code of Canada prohibiting the possession, sale, and 
public display of obscene material, defined as “any publication a 
dominant characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of 
sex, or of sex and any one or more of the following subjects, 
namely, crime, horror, cruelty and violence.”202 
Initially, of course, the Canadian Supreme Court 
determined that offensiveness could not remove obscenity from 
the protection of the Charter’s speech provision.203  But once 
again, this led not to automatic invalidation of the prohibition, 
but rather to application of the Section One balancing test.  
While the Court rejected the contention that Parliament could 
justify infringement of a Charter freedom by merely invoking 
“legal moralism,” (the use of the law to “impose a certain 
standard of public and sexual morality, solely because it reflects 
the conventions of a given community”)204 it accepted as 
legitimate the Parliamentary goal of combating violence 
“degradation, humiliation” and the maintenance of gender 
inequality.205  Having found that the prohibition of obscenity 
was rationally related to such goals, the Court turned to the 
question of whether it advances them with minimal impairment 
 
must prove it is “utterly without redeeming social importance”). 
200.  See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatres v. 
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973).  Each case broadened the scope of legally 
obscene material to include work that lacked “serious” literary, artistic, 
political or scientific value, rather than the Memoirs and Roth standard of 
“utterly” lacking such value. 
201.  R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.). 
202.  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 163(8) (Can.). 
203.  R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 486-89 (Can.). 
204.  Id. at 492. 
205.  Id. at 493. 
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to free speech right. 
The Court concluded that the statute satisfied the test.206  In 
doing so, it reviewed the existing tests for determining whether 
a work is “undue exploitation,” and concluded that under a 
synthesis of the tests, only a minimal amount of material would 
actually be proscribed.207  Here, the Court’s balancing test 
employs its own process of categorization, not to determine 
whether obscenity is entitled to some Charter protection, but 
rather to determine whether the questioned work falls within a 
statute reasonably limited to cause minimum impairment of the 
free speech right.  Justice Sopinka stated that “[p]ornography 
can be usefully divided into three categories: (1) explicit sex with 
violence, (2) explicit sex without violence but which subjects 
people to treatment that is degrading or dehumanizing, and (3) 
explicit sex without violence that is neither degrading nor 
dehumanizing.”208  Pornography that falls into the first category 
“will almost always constitute the undue exploitation of sex;”209 
work that falls into the second category “may be undue if the risk 
of harm is substantial;”210 material in the third category “is 
generally tolerated in our society and will not qualify as the 
undue exploitation of sex unless it employs children in its 
production.”211  In addition to all of this, the Court noted that 
“materials which have scientific, artistic or literary merit” do not 
constitute undue exploitation of sex; “the court must be generous 
in its application” of this defense.212 
The balance struck by the Court in Butler can be criticized 
as being either too deferential to the legislature or too protective 
of pornographic material, but the analysis does attempt to 
recognize and take seriously both the right of expression and the 
genuine social concerns presented.  The Butler approach can be 
contrasted with American Booksellers v. Hudnut,213 in which the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated an Indianapolis 
 
206.  Id. at 504-09. 
207.  Id. at 484-85. 
208.  R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 484 (Can.). 
209.  Id. at 485. 
210.  Id. 
211.  Id. 
212.  Id. at 505. 
213.  Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d 
mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
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ordinance that attempted to create liability for the 
dissemination of pornography (not limited to obscenity) on the 
ground that there is a causal relationship between the 
pornography and gender-based violence or discrimination.214 
Drawing a sharp categorical distinction between obscene 
and all other sexually oriented material minimizes the need for 
courts to seriously evaluate the strength of the contending 
interests involved.  The Indianapolis ordinance may well have 
failed the Butler proportionality approach, but the categorical 
approach eliminates the need to assess the actual strength of the 
threats to individual expression and significant social objectives. 
The maintenance of separate categories with different levels 
of scrutiny, as opposed to a single proportionality test, can also 
limit the ability of courts to use analogical reasoning where 
appropriate.  When considering a California statute limiting the 
sale of violent video games to minors, the Supreme Court did 
little more than note that, unlike obscenity, there was no 
category of violent media that called for limited First 
Amendment protection and struck the restriction down.215  
Justice Breyer dissented.216 
Breyer, who has shown some enthusiasm for proportionality 
analysis in his separate opinions,217 noted that the restrictions 
placed minimal burdens on video game companies that already 
voluntarily labelled violent game as inappropriate for minors, 
and on minors themselves, who could have access to the games 
if they were given the games by parents or other adults who 
made the actual purchases.218  He further noted that the Court 
has consistently upheld restrictions that placed age limitations 
on the sale or purchase of non-obscene sexually oriented 
material.219  The balance of interests in each of these cases seems 
roughly equivalent, yet the use of rigid categories, rather than a 
 
214.  Id. at 330-32. 
215.  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011). 
216.  Id. at 840-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
217.  See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 47-52 (2003) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (holding that a 25-year sentence under “three strikes” law is 
“overkill”).  
218.  Brown, 564 U.S. at 848. 
219.  Id. at 848-49.  While Breyer applies strict scrutiny, his stress on the 
importance of the state interest in protecting children, and the minor intrusion 
on free speech, closely resembles proportionality analysis. 
36https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/5
BESCHLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/18  10:27 PM 
420 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 38:2 
single proportionality test, forecloses careful consideration of 
whether similar treatment is appropriate. 
A proportionality test might well lead to more careful 
consideration of legislation by legislators themselves.  In United 
States v. Stevens,220 the Supreme Court invalidated a federal 
statute that prohibited the sale or distribution of videos of 
intentional animal cruelty.221  The specific target of the statute 
was a genre known as “crush videos,” aimed at viewers who 
derive sexual pleasure from viewing small animals crushed by 
women in high heels.222  The Court found the statute 
significantly overbroad.223 
The government defended the statute by maintaining that 
depictions of animal cruelty should become a new category of 
unprotected speech.224  The Court rejected the argument.225  At 
the same time, Chief Justice Roberts noted that a more narrowly 
focused statute might survive First Amendment review.226  The 
categorical approach, with its all-or-nothing aspects, can easily 
lead to legislation unconcerned with overbreadth.  In contrast, 
anticipating the use of proportionality by a reviewing court 
should motivate legislators to more carefully tailor statues at 
their inception. 
There may be no area of constitutional rights litigation in 
which continued adherence to the language of tier analysis has 
led to more confusion then the Free Exercise Clause.  The next 
section will explore how the introduction of proportionality 
might, whether changing outcomes or not, at least make what 
courts are doing more transparent. 
 
III. Proportionality in Free Exercise Analysis 
 
The Supreme Court has been anything but consistent over 
the years in its approach to the scope of the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment.  In 1878, the Court considered the 
 
220.  See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
221.  Id. 
222.  Id. at 465. 
223.  Id. at 472-75. 
224.  Id. at 468-70. 
225.  Id. at 471. 
226.  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481 (2010). 
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claim of a Mormon polygamist that the Free Exercise Clause 
justified the performance of a religious duty, in this case, plural 
marriage, despite the federal statute criminalizing polygamy in 
the territories.227  The Court upheld the conviction, defining the 
scope of the Free Exercise Clause in terms that made it not only 
narrow, but also somewhat duplicative of the First Amendment’s 
protection of speech.228 
Drawing on a letter written by Thomas Jefferson,229 the 
Court made a distinction between the limitation on 
government’s power “to intrude . . . into the field of opinion, and 
to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on 
supposition of their ill tendency” and the legitimate power of 
government “to interfere when principles break out into overt 
acts against peace and good order.”230  In short, the Free Exercise 
Clause protected belief and advocacy, but actions were only 
protected by the general constitutional requirements that later 
generations would refer to as the low-level “rational basis” test. 
This remained the standard for free exercise analysis for 
decades.  Believers were successful in a number of cases that 
presented situations involving speech-related issues.  In 
Cantwell v. Connecticut,231 religious solicitors succeeded in 
challenging a local licensing system that permitted the 
administrator excessive discretion to label a cause as 
nonreligious.  In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,232 
the Court invalidated a compulsory flag-salute requirement as 
applied to public school students who objected on religious 
grounds. 
Decisions involving religious advocacy were not always 
decided in favor of the believers, however.  In Chaplinsky v. New 
 
227.  See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
228.  Id. at 163 (holding that Congress could not “intrude his powers into 
the field of opinion, and . . . restrain the profession or propagation of 
principles,” but could act where “overt acts” threatened “peace and good 
order.”). 
229.  Id. at 164 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury 
Baptist Ass’n (Jan. 1, 1802)). 
230.  Id. at 163 (quoting H.D. 82, 1779 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 
1779)). 
231.  See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
232.  W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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Hampshire,233 the Defendant’s conviction for hurling “fighting 
words” at a constable was affirmed with no particular attention 
given to the religious message being delivered by the street 
preacher.234  And in Prince v. Massachusetts,235 the Court 
rejected a free exercise challenge to a statute prohibiting the use 
of children in religious solicitations.236 
Not until 1963 did the Supreme Court find in favor of a 
petitioner claiming a free exercise exemption from a generally 
applicable statutory duty where the claim rested entirely on 
conduct rather than speech or belief alone.  In Sherbert v. 
Verner,237 a Seventh-Day Adventist was unable to qualify for 
unemployment benefits from South Carolina due to her refusal 
to accept appropriate employment that would require work on 
Saturday, which would violate Adventist principles.238 
The Court noted that South Carolina had forced the 
applicant “to choose between following the precepts of her 
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning 
one of the precepts of her religion.”239  When such a burden is 
placed on a believer, the Court held it would be necessary for the 
state to justify it under the strict scrutiny analysis developed in 
equal protection cases.240  The state would have to present a 
compelling state interest and demonstrate that its refusal to 
accommodate was necessary to satisfy that interest.  The Court 
dismissed as unconvincing the State’s suggestion that 
“fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious 
objection,” would threaten the unemployment compensation 
funds.241 
Sherbert established strict scrutiny as the norm for free 
exercise analysis, and this was reinforced nine years later in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder.242  Members of Amish communities had no 
 
233.  See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).  
234.  Id. at 570 (the trial court excluded as irrelevant testimony that the 
defendant’s purpose was “to preach the true facts of the Bible”). 
235.  See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
236.  Id. at 170-71. 
237.  See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
238.  Id. at 406-07. 
239.  Id. at 404. 
240.  Id. at 406. 
241.  Id. at 407. 
242.  See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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objection to sending their children to school through the eighth 
grade (typically until age fourteen), but objected to the 
requirement that their children attend public or private school 
until age sixteen.243  The Amish maintained that the high 
schools their children would have to attend until age sixteen 
would impart values and skills likely to alienate the children 
from the Amish “church community separate and apart from the 
world and worldly influence,” a concept “central to their faith.”244 
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court found that Wisconsin did 
have a compelling interest in seeing that young people had 
sufficient education to become productive members of society.245  
But, taking account of the history of Amish self-sufficiency and 
peaceful and law-abiding coexistence with the larger non-Amish 
world, the Court held that Wisconsin had failed to demonstrate 
that its insistence on two years of high school, with no exception 
for the Amish, was necessary to further that interest.246 
While Yoder could be viewed as a case presenting several 
rights claims, including parental rights and speech-related First 
Amendment rights along with free exercise claim, it was widely 
viewed as a restatement of the Sherbert principle applying strict 
scrutiny to free exercise cases.  In the years following Yoder, 
however, free exercise strict scrutiny appeared to be a far weaker 
test than most would expect it to be. 
Is achieving the optimal pedestrian crowd flow at the 
Minnesota State Fair really a compelling state interest?247  Is 
denying a military psychologist the right to wear a yarmulke on 
military bases necessary to preserve the government’s 
compelling interest in consistent uniform standards?248  These 
and other cases led commentators to note that free exercise strict 
scrutiny was rather feeble.249 
 
243.  Id. at 210. 
244.  Id. 
245.  Id. at 221. 
246.  Id. at 234-36. 
247.  See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 
640 (1981) (holding that there was no free exercise exemption from regulation 
limiting solicitation at fairgrounds to fixed spot). 
248.  See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that there 
was no free exercise exemption from military uniform requirements). 
249.  See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U.L. REV. 437, 
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When the Court considered Employment Division v. 
Smith250 in 1990, few would have expected a serious shift in the 
articulation or application of the free exercise analytical 
standards.  Claimants were Native American Church members 
who ingested peyote for sacramental purposes.251  Their peyote 
use led to their discharge from employment by a private drug 
rehabilitation program and their inability to qualify for 
unemployment compensation because they had been dismissed 
for misconduct.252  The Oregon Supreme Court upheld their right 
to an exemption claim based on the Free Exercise Clause.253 
As a case involving unemployment compensation, Smith 
could be seen as squarely within the scope of Sherbert.  But 
unlike earlier unemployment-related cases, this one presented a 
“war on drugs” justification for the denial of the exemption.  The 
Court has shown little inclination to interfere with government 
efforts to fight illegal drug use, whether the issue presented 
involves the Fourth Amendment,254 the First Amendment’s Free 
Speech Clause,255 or federalism.256  Few would have expected 
Smith to prevail; most would have anticipated the Court to apply 
its “feeble” version of free exercise strict scrutiny257 and reverse 
the Oregon Supreme Court.  But, as discussed above, Justice 
Scalia writing for a five-justice majority, held that strict scrutiny 
was inappropriate when the exemption sought was from a 
statute of general applicability, and did not actually 
discriminate against religion.258 
 
446-47 (1994) (playing on Gunther’s phrase, the authors state that post-
Sherbert strict scrutiny had become “strict in theory but feeble in fact”). 
250.  See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990). 
251.  Id. at 874. 
252.  Id. 
253.  See Smith v. Emp’t Div., 763 P.2d 146 (Or. 1988), rev’d 494 U.S. 872 
(1990). 
254.  See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that 
a minor traffic violation justifies police stop in “high drug area”). 
255.  See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (holding that a 
school may punish students for speech that is perceived as advocating use of 
illegal drugs). 
256.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that Congress 
may penalize grower of marijuana for own use under the Commerce Clause). 
257.  See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 249. 
258.  See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
41
BESCHLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/18  10:27 PM 
2018 NO MORE TIERS? 425 
Given Justice Scalia’s general hostility toward balancing 
tests,259 it would seem likely that he intended to clarify free 
exercise analysis and make it more predictable.  Subsequent 
developments, however, have seriously undermined this goal.  
While the academic response to Smith was mixed,260 reaction in 
the political world was sharply negative.  Religious 
conservatives saw a threat to believers, while religious and 
secular liberals saw an unfortunate contraction of individual 
rights.  Congress responded to Smith with the 1993 enactment 
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,261 which essentially 
instructed federal courts to apply pre-Smith standards to free 
exercise claims.  In its first encounter with the Act, the Supreme 
Court held in City of Boerne v. Flores,262 that the Act was 
unconstitutional, at least insofar as it set a standard for review 
of state and local government actions. 
Congress had based the Act on its power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment restrictions on state action.263  
Revisiting a longstanding debate concerning the scope of this 
authority, the Court held that it did not include the authority to 
define the scope of the right itself, a task entrusted to the courts, 
but only to provide enforcement of the right as defined by the 
Court.264  The scope of the Free Exercise Clause, as defined by 
the Court, extends no further than to protect against 
antireligious discrimination.265  Here, the Court saw the Act as 
attempting to extend the scope of the right to include protection 
against application of neutral statutes of general application to 
religious believers in some circumstances.266 
But the City of Boerne decision only invalidated the Act 
insofar as it invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to limit the 
states.  Congress may, of course, amend its own statutes, and 
 
259.  See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
260.  Compare Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the 
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) (critical of Smith), with Marci 
A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public 
Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099 (defending Smith). 
261.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012). 
262.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
263.  Id. at 529. 
264.  Id. at 529-36. 
265.  Id. at 529. 
266.  Id. at 532. 
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the Act remains effective where religious exemptions are sought 
against federal statutes.267  And Congress, relying on its Article 
I powers enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act.268  As the title makes clear, the Act dealt with free 
exercise claims in two different contexts, each at the state or 
local level. 
Where a local land use restriction places a “substantial 
burden” on religious exercise, it must be both nondiscriminatory 
toward religious uses, and also be the least restrictive means of 
achieving a compelling government interest.269  Similarly, 
regulations that substantially limit free exercise by prisoners or 
other institutionalized persons in institutions receiving federal 
financial support are entitled to an exemption unless the state 
can meet a similar test.270 
States are free, of course, to extend rights contained in their 
own constitutions beyond the scope of the analogous federal 
right, provided that the decision does not conflict with another 
federally-guaranteed right.  In the wake of Smith, many states 
took legislative or judicial action to interpret state free exercise 
guarantees to require Sherbert-like strict scrutiny to justify 
refusals to grant religious exemptions to generally applicable 
statutes.271  While one may argue that this creates a potential 
conflict with the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the 
Supreme Court has suggested that states have some leeway in 
balancing free exercise and non-establishment principles.272 
 
 
267.  See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 
U.S. 418 (2006) (strict scrutiny applied to free exercise exemption claim against 
federal statute). 
268.  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012). 
269.  Id. 
270.  See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (applying the Act 
in a case brought by a prisoner denied access to religious literature and 
ceremonial items). 
271.  See generally Symposium, Restoring Religious Freedom in the States, 
32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513 (1999). 
272.  See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (holding that the state may 
apply its own establishment clause more strictly than called for by the First 
Amendment Establishment Clause); but see Trinity Lutheran Church of 
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (holding that Missouri’s state 
constitutional establishment clause must yield to free exercise demands of 
equal treatment of religious institution). 
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Thus, the appropriate level of scrutiny in free exercise cases 
will depend on whether the claim is based on the First 
Amendment, federal statutes, or state law.  If the relevant test 
is the pre-Smith, Sherbert standard, a more interesting question 
arises.  The language of compelling government interest and 
least restrictive means suggests a test that will be extremely 
difficult for government to satisfy.  But as we have seen, during 
the decades between Sherbert and Smith, the Court found ways 
to uphold government refusals to grant exemptions while giving 
lip service to strict scrutiny.273 
Balancing factors can find the way into cases that on their 
face call for strict scrutiny.  In free exercise cases, an initial 
inquiry as to the religious nature of the claim itself can derail 
strict scrutiny.  Similarly, when the claim is based on a statute 
protecting against “substantial” interference with free exercise, 
the claim can fail at this stage if the court holds that the 
government interference is less than substantial.274  And even 
where the strict scrutiny test is invoked, pre-Smith cases 
demonstrate the extent to which courts may give substantial 
deference in situations involving prison authorities or military 
decisions.275 
Proportionality may or may not lead to different outcomes 
in free exercise cases, but it would create a simple, and more 
sensitive approach.  Smith itself can be compared to a 
remarkably similar case from the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa.  In Prince v. President of the Cape Law Society,276 the 
Appellant had been barred from admission to the practice of law 
because he had been convicted of illegal possession of marijuana 
and insisted he would continue to use marijuana as required by 




273.  See supra notes 245-244 and accompanying text. 
274.  See generally Karla L. Chaffee & Dwight H. Merriam, Six Fact 
Patterns of Substantial Burden in RLUIPA: Lessons for Potential Litigants, 2 
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 437 (2009). 
275.  See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
276.  See Prince v. President of the Cape Law Society 2002 (2) SA 784 (CC) 
(S. Afr.). 
277.  Id. ¶ 142. 
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The Court engaged in an “evaluation of proportionality” as 
called for by the provision of the South Africa Constitution that 
provides: 
 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only 
in terms of law of general application to the extent 
that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in 
an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account 
all relevant factors, including— 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the    
limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its 
purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose.278 
 
Applying this standard, the Court rejected the applicant’s 
claim for a religiously based exemption.279  In doing so, the 
majority explicitly rejected the majority view of the United 
States Supreme Court in Smith, endorsing instead the Smith 
minority approach, which the South African Court characterized 
as a “balancing analysis.”280  That the Court struck the balance 
in this case in favor of the government is evidence that 
proportionality does not necessarily result in greatly enhanced 
protection for the individual. Although he wrote in dissent, 
Justice Sachs no doubt expressed the view of the South Africa 
Court as to the value of proportionality: 
 
Limitations analysis under our Constitution is 
based not on formal or categorical reasoning but 
on processes of balancing and proportionality as 
required by section 36. This Court has accordingly 
rejected the view of the majority in the United 
 
278.  Id. ¶ 128 n.49 (quoting S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 36(1)). 
279.  Id. ¶ 139. 
280.  Id. ¶ 128. 
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States Supreme Court that it is an inevitable 
outcome of democracy that in a multi-faith society 
minority religions may find themselves without 
remedy against burdens imposed upon them by 
formally neutral laws. Equally, on the other hand, 
it would not accept as an inevitable outcome of 
constitutionalism that each and every statutory 
restriction on religious practice must be 
invalidated. On the contrary, limitations analysis 
under section 36 is antithetical to extreme 
positions which end up setting the irresistible 
force of democracy and general law enforcement, 
against the immovable object of constitutionalism 
and protection of fundamental rights.281 
 
A further example of how the use of proportionality analysis 
in free exercise cases can lead to a more sensitive consideration 
of relevant factors is found in the recent decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Movement Laique Quebecois v. Saguenay 
(City).282  Plaintiffs challenged the practice of the Saguenay City 
Council of beginning each session with a Christian prayer.283  
Only months earlier, the United States Supreme Court had 
considered a similar factual situation in Town of Greece v. 
Galloway.284  In Town of Greece, the Court classified the case as 
one presenting an Establishment Clause issue, and decided, 
primarily on the basis of precedent, that legislative bodies may 
open their session with formal spoken prayer.285 
The Canadian Constitution does not contain an equivalent 
of the First Amendment Establishment Clause.  But the 
Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that government 
neutrality toward religion can be seen as an aspect of the 
protection of religious freedom of the individual.  And so, in cases 
 
281.  Id. ¶ 155 (Sachs, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
282.  Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3 
(Can.). 
283.  Id. at 14. 
284.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
285.  Id. at 1820 (Justice Kennedy relied on Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 
783 (1983), which upheld the practice of the Nebraska State Legislature in 
opening its sessions with a prayer delivered by a chaplain).  
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involving such issues as Sunday closing laws286 and prayer in 
public schools,287 the Court has reached results similar to those 
decided in the United States under the Establishment Clause.288  
Ironically, however, in these legislative prayer cases, the 
Canadian Court more rigorously protects non-establishment 
principles, despite the absence of an Establishment Clause, than 
the United States Court. 
In a subtle way, separating the Establishment Clause from 
the Free Exercise Clause may place too much emphasis, in 
Establishment Clause cases, on the apparent blameworthiness 
of government action and too little on the individual right 
involved.  Recognizing government neutrality as a means of 
assuring freedom of religion shifts the focus to the individual 
rights claimant. 
With the focus on the rights granted to the plaintiff, the 
Court then summarized the test to be applied: 
 
[T]he criteria developed by the Court in 
interpreting s. 1 of the Canadian Charter apply to 
the interpretation of s. 9.1 (Irwin Toy Ltd. v. 
Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 
p. 980; Ford, at pp. 769-71). The impugned 
provision must therefore satisfy the justification 
test enunciated in Oakes, which requires the state 
to prove on a balance of probabilities (1) that the 
legislative objective is of sufficient importance, in 
the sense that it relates to pressing and 
substantial concerns, and (2) that the means 
chosen to achieve the objective are proportional. 
This second requirement has three components: 
(i) the means chosen must be rationally connected 
to the objective; (ii) they must impair the right in 
question as little as possible; and (iii) they must 
not so severely trench on individual or group 
 
286.  See R v. Big M Drug Mart, Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can.). 
287.  See Zylberberg v. Sudbury Bd. of Educ. (1988), 65 O.R. 2d 641 (Can. 
Ont. C.A.). 
288.  See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidating required 
recitation of prayer in public schools); but see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 
(1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws). 
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rights that the objective is outweighed by the 
seriousness of the intrusion.289 
 
Applying this test, the Court found that the infringement of 
the rights of non-believers was substantial, and that little 
attention needed to be paid to much of the balancing test since 
the City had failed to present an important government interest 
in the practice.290  One important point to note is that the 
Canadian Charter, like many national and international 
declarations of individual rights dating to the post-World War II 
era, expands the freedom to include “conscience” in addition to 
religion,291 making the sometimes thorny question of what 
qualifies as a religion for First Amendment purposes irrelevant. 
The use of a single proportionality test will not necessarily 
lead to outcomes significantly similar or different than the use 
of separate categorical tests, whether in freedom of religion 
cases or elsewhere.  But it does encourage serious consideration 
of all of the interests presented.  An Establishment Clause case 
is also about freedom of religion; a case seeking a Free Exercise 
exception from a general duty calls into question government’s 
obligation of religious neutrality.  These overlaps have certainly 
been noticed, but the tendency to place a case in one or another 
category, leading to one or another separate analytical test, may 
lead to overvalue or undervalue one of the competing interest 
involved. 
In 2013, the United States Commission on Civil Rights 
conducted hearings and issued a report considering the 
conflicting positions presented by demands for statutory or 
judicial exemption for religious believers from duties of 
nondiscrimination imposed upon government, individuals and 
institutions, both religious and other institutions.292  In 
addressing the conflicts between free exercise and 
nondiscrimination values, the Commission would necessarily 
 
289.  Mouvement laïque québécois c. Saguenay (City), [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3, 
para. 90 (Can.) (citation omitted).  
290.  Id. ¶ 150. 
291.  See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
art. 18 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
292.  See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: 
RECONCILING NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL LIBERTIES 1-4 (2016). 
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need to consider a number of contexts presenting a number of 
statutory and constitutional sources of law. 
If an exemption for a federal statutory duty was denied, the 
relevant standard was that contained in the federal Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act.293  If an exemption from a state 
statutory duty was denied, the relevant standard might be the 
Smith framework, or a more stringent standard set forth in 
federal law or state Religious Freedom Acts.294  And in the 
background of these statutory attempts to protect religious 
freedom stands the First Amendment Establishment Clause.  
The Commission’s 2016 report stressed that Smith and 
statutory reactions to it made no changes to the demands of the 
Establishment Clause.295  At what point does the grant of 
exemption to religiously-motivated objectors raise 
Establishment Clause issues?  And in addition to the likely need 
to consider more than one source of law, a claim of an 
entitlement to an exemption might be raised by an individual, a 
church, a non-profit institution with church affiliation, or even a 
for-profit corporation with no obvious religious purpose. 
The Commissioners differed sharply, in the official report 
and recommendations, with the majority findings and 
recommendations coming down “resoundingly in favor of 
nondiscrimination”296 and generally against accommodations: 
(1) schools must be allowed to insist on inclusive 
values; 2) throughout history, religious doctrines 
accepted at one time later become viewed as 
discriminatory, with religions changing 
accordingly; 3) without exemptions, groups would 
not use the pretext of religious doctrines to 
discriminate; 4) a doctrine that distinguishes 
between beliefs (which should be protected) and 
conduct (which should conform to the law) is fairer 
and easier to apply; 5) third parties, such as 
employees, should not be forced to live under the 
religious doctrines of their employers [unless the 
 
293.  See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
294.  See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
295.  See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 292, at 25-26 (findings 
4-5). 
296.  See id. at 42 (statement of Commissioner Peter Kirsanow). 
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employer is allowed to impose such constraints by 
virtue of the ministerial exception]; 6) a basic 
[civil] right as important as the freedom to marry 
should not be subject to religious beliefs; and 7) 
even a widely accepted doctrine such as the 
ministerial exemption should be subject to review 
as to whether church employees have religious 
duties. 
 
Further, specifically with regard to number (2) 
above, religious doctrines that were widely 
accepted at one time came to be deemed highly 
discriminatory, such as slavery, homosexuality 
bans, and unequal treatment of women, and that 
what is considered within the purview of religious 




1. Overly-broad religious exemptions unduly 
burden nondiscrimination laws and policies. 
Federal and state courts, lawmakers, and policy-
makers at every level must tailor religious 
exceptions to civil liberties and civil rights 
protections as narrowly as applicable law 
requires. 
 
2. RFRA protects only religious practitioners’ 
First Amendment free exercise rights, and it does 
not limit others’ freedom from government-
imposed religious limitations under the 
Establishment Clause. 
 
3. In the absence of controlling authority to the 
contrary such as a state-level, RFRA-type statute, 
the recognition of religious exemptions to 
nondiscrimination laws and policies should be 
made pursuant to the holdings of Employment 
Division v. Smith, which protect religious beliefs 
rather than conduct. 
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4. Federal legislation should be considered to 
clarify that RFRA creates First Amendment Free 
Exercise Clause rights only for individuals and 
religious institutions and only to the extent that 
they do not unduly burden civil liberties and civil 
rights protections against status-based 
discrimination. 
 
5. States with RFRA-style laws should amend 
those statutes to clarify that RFRA creates First 
Amendment Free Exercise Clause rights only for 
individuals and religious institutions. States with 
laws modeled after RFRA must guarantee that 
those statutes do not unduly burden civil liberties 
and civil rights with status-based 
discrimination.297 
 
In contrast, dissenting Commissioners argued just as 
vigorously for broad recognition of statutory and constitutional 
protection for religiously-based objectors.298  The existence of 
separate analytical tests for free exercise and nondiscrimination 
claims (not to mention the Establishment Clause) may not be 
the main reason for the sharp, nearly polar opposite, conclusions 
of the commissioners.  But perhaps a single proportionality 
analysis might force each side to more seriously consider 
countervailing values, instead of simply declaring themselves 
champions of nondiscrimination and nonestablishment, on one 






297.  See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 292, at 26-27 
(alteration in original). 
298.  See id. at 42-113 (statement of Commissioner Peter Kirsanow 
arguing that “[t]he findings and recommendations in this report should serve 
as an alarm to liberty-loving Americans”).  While sharply disagreeing with the 
majority, Kirsanow voted in favor of the report only in order to allow the report 
to go forward.  Id. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
The use of different tiers of analysis for different categories 
of rights claims might be seen, at least in part, as an attempt to 
achieve a level of predictability and precision that are lacking in 
a more generally applicable balancing test.  Yet the attempt to 
categorize claims as entitled to either little respect or extremely 
powerful constitutional protection has hardly succeeded in 
clarifying constitutional law. 
The last several decades have shown that a more open-
ended balancing approach is not only desirable, but perhaps 
inevitable.  The creation of intermediate scrutiny and First 
Amendment tests for categories once considered outside of the 
protection of the Amendment present the clearest evidence of 
this.  But the persistence of labels such as strict scrutiny or the 
rational basis test, even in cases where they are applied in ways 
that would puzzle their creators, may be even more significant.  
How strict is strict scrutiny if it is clearly not “fatal in fact?”299  
Perhaps nowhere is this confusion more obvious than in current 
free exercise cases, where courts must puzzle over what 
Sherbert-like strict scrutiny really entails. 
The problems with the maintenance of different tiers of 
constitutional analysis has not gone entirely unnoticed in the 
Supreme Court.  Justice Thurgood Marshall expressed 
discomfort with the division of equal protection cases into those 
calling for strict scrutiny and others by noting that there is only 
one equal protection clause rather than multiple clauses for 
different classes.300  More recently, Justice Beyer has 
occasionally suggested an open-ended proportionality test as an 
alternative to current analytical approaches.301 
The use of the proportionality test employed by Canadian, 
European and other courts to evaluate constitutional rights 
claims brings together all of the factors currently employed in 
the various American tests, allowing for full consideration of 
both the interests of the individual and the government in each 
 
299.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
300.  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 478 
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202, 230-31 (1982) (Marshall, J. concurring). 
301.  See supra notes 213-217 and accompanying text. 
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case.  In any particular case, it may or may not lead to a different 
outcome than the currently used tests.  But it avoids ignoring 
significant interests downplayed, if not ignored, by the tests. 
Adoption of proportionality as a single balancing approach 
will likely make many uneasy.  Libertarians will fear weakening 
of the supposed advantages of strict scrutiny; majoritarians will 
fear extending more protection to those currently protected only 
by low-level rational bans analysis.  But both positions are 
already eroding, and it may be time to recognize that the 
insights present in each of the current tiers of analysis can be 
preserved by building them into a generalized proportionality 
test. 
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